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Abstract
We present simple protocols for oblivious transfer and password-based identification which
are secure against general attacks in the noisy-quantum-storage model as defined in [KWW09].
We argue that a technical tool from [KWW09] suffices to prove security of the known protocols.
Whereas the more involved protocol for oblivious transfer from [KWW09] requires less noise
in storage to achieve security, our “canonical” protocols have the advantage of being simpler
to implement and the security error is easier control. Therefore, our protocols yield higher
OT-rates for many realistic noise parameters.
Furthermore, the first proof of security of a direct protocol for password-based identification
against general noisy-quantum-storage attacks is given.
1 Introduction
Throughout history, a main goal of cryptography has been to provide secure communication over
insecure channels. In today’s internet-driven society however, more advanced tasks arise: people
need to do business and interact with peers they neither know nor trust. A simple example is secure
identification: Users Alice and Bob share a password P and when setting up a communication,
Alice wants to make sure she is really interacting with Bob—the only other person who knows
P . Simply announcing P is insecure, as any eavesdropper can intercept P and use it later to
impersonate Bob. We need a method to check whether two parties are in possession of the same
password, but without revealing any additional information.
Secure identification is a special case of the more general problem of secure two-party computa-
tion: Alice and Bob want to perform a computation on private inputs in a way that they obtain the
correct result but no additional information about their inputs is revealed. An interesting example
are sealed-bit auctions where the winner should be determined without opening the losing bids.
Closer to everyday life, almost any interaction with an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) can be
seen as an instance of secure two-party computation.
The techniques used in modern classical cryptography to secure communication and provide
secure two-party computation are based on unproven mathematical assumptions such as the hard-
ness of finding the prime factors of large integer numbers (for example in the widely used RSA
scheme [RSA78]). We do not know any practical schemes which are provably infeasible to break
and it is unlikely that the currently known mathematical techniques allow for such a scheme. In
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contrast, quantum cryptography, which is based on transmitting information stored in the state of
single elementary particles, offers schemes with provable security.
The most prominent example is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) which allows two honest
parties to securely communicate. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed a QKD protocol [BB84]
which was proven unconditionally secure [May95, Yao95, SP00]. In other words, security does
not rely on any unproven assumptions but holds against any eavesdropper Eve with unbounded
(quantum) computing power. Such provably secure key-distribution schemes cannot be achieved
by any classical means (without additional assumptions). It is important to realize that the tech-
nical requirements for honest parties to perform QKD protocols are well within reach of current
technology. As of today, the technology has even reached commercial level: At least three different
companies are selling hardware for QKD [Sma, idQ, Mag].
After the discovery of QKD, researchers thought it was possible to use quantum communica-
tion to implement more advanced cryptographic primitives such as secure two-party computation.
However, it was shown in the late 90s that essentially no cryptographic two-party primitives can
be realized if only a quantum channel is available and no further restriction on the adversary is
assumed [May97, LC97, Lo97]. In other words, secure two-party computation is more difficult to
achieve than key distribution. This is not completely surprising given the generality of secure two-
party computation. Nevertheless, quantum cryptography might still help to achieve significantly
better schemes than purely classical constructions.
Indeed, in joint work with Damg˚ard, Fehr and Salvail, we proposed in 2005 a new realistic
assumption for quantum protocols under which provably secure two-party computation becomes
possible [DFSS05]. The basic idea is to exploit the technical difficulty of storing quantum infor-
mation. In this bounded-quantum-storage model, security holds based on the sole assumption that
the parties’ quantum memory during the execution of the protocol is upper bounded. No further
restrictions on the (quantum) computing power nor the classical memory size are assumed. Storing
quantum information requires to keep the state of very small physical systems such as single atoms
or photons under stable conditions over a long time. Building a reliable quantum memory is a major
research goal in experimental quantum physics [JSC+04, CMJ+05, EAM+05, CDLK08, AFK+08].
Despite these efforts, current technology only allows storage times of at most a few milliseconds.
Even though breaking the security of our protocols requires a large quantum memory with
long storage times, neither quantum memory nor the ability to perform quantum computations
are needed to actually run the protocols; the technological requirements for honest parties are
comparable to QKD and hence well within reach of current technology. Therefore, cryptographic
schemes based on storage imperfections provide potentially very useful solutions for secure two-
party computation with the advantage of much stronger security guarantees compared to classical
technology.
1.1 Bounded- versus Noisy-Quantum-Storage Model
In the bounded-quantum-storage model, we assume that a dishonest receiver can perfectly store
the incoming photons and perform perfect quantum operations under the sole restriction that at
a certain point of the protocol, the size of his quantum memory is limited to a constant fraction
of the total number of received photons. Bounding the size of the adversary’s quantum storage in
this way is a handy assumption to work with in security proofs. In a series of works over the last
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years [DFSS05, DFR+07, DFSS07, Sch07, DFSS08, DFSS10], it has been shown that any type of
secure two-party computation is possible in the bounded-quantum-storage model.
On the other hand, simply limiting the adversary’s quantum memory size does not capture
correctly the difficulty one currently faces when trying to store photons. A better formalization
of this difficulty is to assume that the dishonest receiver uses the best available (but still imper-
fect) photon-storage device. The imperfection of the storage-device is modeled as noisy quantum
channel where the noise level of the channel increases with the amount of time during which the
quantum information needs to be stored. With current technology, the noise reaches maximum
level (i.e. the quantum information is completely lost) if a storage time in the order of milliseconds
is required [JSC+04].
First results in this noisy-quantum-storage model have been established in joint work with
Terhal and Wehner [WST08, STW09]. Assuming “individual-storage attacks”—where the adver-
sary treats all incoming qubits in the same way—the security of oblivious transfer and password-
based identification was established using the original protocols from the bounded-quantum-storage
model [DFR+07, DFSS10].
The most general storage attacks were first mentioned in [Sch07], but addressed only recently
by Ko¨nig, Wehner and Wullschleger [KWW09]. In this most general model, the adversary can
for example try to use a quantum error-correcting code in order to protect himself from storage
errors. Concretely, he is allowed to first perform an arbitrary perfect “encoding attack” on the
incoming quantum state, then he uses his (noisy) quantum-storage device together with unlimited
classical memory and finally, he can again perform perfect quantum computations.1 The authors
of [KWW09] show how the security of protocols in this general model can be related to the maximal
rate of classical information that can be transmitted over the noisy storage channel.
In more detail, [KWW09] introduces the conceptual novelty of splitting the security analysis of
protocols for oblivious transfer and bit commitment in two phases. In the first phase, the players
use the well-known BB84 quantum coding scheme to achieve a (quantum) primitive which the
authors call weak string erasure. At the end of this phase, the sender has a classical n-bit string X
and the receiver holds an “erased version” of the string where a uniformly random half of the bits
of X have been erased. Note that this primitive is only classical for honest players, as a dishonest
receiver might hold quantum information about the sender’s classical output string.
For the second (purely classical) phase, they propose classical reductions to build bit commit-
ment and oblivious transfer based on weak string erasure. Their approach to realize oblivious
transfer is quite involved. It uses interactive hashing [Sav07], for which the standard classical
protocol requires a lot of communication rounds [NOVY98]2. The analysis is complicated by the
fact that the dishonest receiver holds quantum information, but can be handled by techniques of
min-entropy sampling developed by Ko¨nig and Renner [KR07]. It was left as open question how
to build password-based identification based on weak string erasure or in general, secure against
noisy-quantum-storage attacks.
1A detailed description of the model of [KWW09] will be given in Section 3, see also Figure 1.
2A constant-round variant of interactive hashing has been proposed in [DHRS04]. However, it is unclear how
the weaker security guarantees affect the security proof in [KWW09]. The use of η-almost t-wise independent
permutations might render this variant “prohibitively complicated to implement in practice” [Sav07].
3
Secure 1-2 OT Canonical Protocol Secure Identification
[WST08, STW09] individual attacks Yes individual attacks
[KWW09] general attacks No No
This work general attacks Yes general attacks
Table 1: Summary of previous results in the noisy-quantum-storage model and the results presented
here.
1.2 Our Results and Outline of the Paper
The main contribution of this paper is the insight that the new technical tool derived in [KWW09]
already suffices to prove secure the original protocols from the bounded-quantum-storage model for
bit commitment, oblivious transfer [DFR+07] and password-based identification [DFSS07, DFSS10].
These original protocols have the advantage that the classical post-processing is extremely simpel.
No communication-intensive protocols such as interactive hashing are needed.
Comparing the protocol for oblivious transfer from [KWW09] with our protocol, it turns out
that the highly interactive protocol [KWW09] can in theory be shown secure for less noisy quantum-
storage channels if infinitely many pulses are available, i.e., security holds against a larger class
of adversarial receivers. However, the original protocols with the simpler analysis presented here
outperform the ones from [KWW09] in terms of the security error. Thus, for a fixed number of
pulses and a given security threshold, the simpler protocols and our analysis yield oblivious transfer
of longer bit-strings most of the time.
We show for the first time the security against general noisy-storage attacks of a direct protocol
for password-based identification, answering an open question posed in [KWW09].
From a theoretical point of view, our insight shows that despite the generality of the noisy-
quantum-storage model, having the right tools from [DFR+07, KWW09] at hand, the protocols
and security proofs do not need to be much more complicated than in the conceptually simpler
bounded-quantum-storage model.
1.3 Outline of the Paper
In Section 2, we define concepts and notation and elaborate on the essential tool of min-entropy
splitting in Section 2.3. We present the noisy-quantum-storage and the key ingredient from [KWW09]
in Section 3. Sections 4, 5 and 6 contain the security analyses for oblivious transfer and password-
based identification.
2 Preliminaries
We start by introducing the necessary definitions, tools and technical lemmas that we need in the
remainder of this text.
2.1 Basic Concepts
We use ∈R to denote the uniform choice of an element from a set. We further use x|I to denote the
string x = x1, . . . , xn restricted to the bits indexed by the set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. For a binary random
variable C, we denote by C the bit different from C.
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Classical-Quantum States A cq-state ρXE is a state that is partly classical, partly quantum,
and can be written as
ρXE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ
x
E .
Here, X is a classical random variable distributed over the finite set X according to distribution
PX , {|x〉}x∈X is a set of orthonormal states and the register E is in state ρ
x
E when X takes on value
x.
Conditional Independence. We also need to express that a random variable X is (close to)
independent of a quantum state E when given a random variable Y . This means that when given
Y , the state E gives no additional information on X. Formally, this is expressed by requiring that
ρXY E equals (or is close to) ρX↔Y↔E, which is defined as
3
ρX↔Y↔E :=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρ
y
E . (1)
In other words, ρXYE = ρX↔Y↔E precisely if ρ
x,y
E = ρ
y
E for all x and y. To further illustrate its
meaning, notice that if the Y -register is measured and value y is obtained, then the state ρX↔Y↔E
collapses to (
∑
x PX|Y (x|y)|x〉〈x|)⊗ ρ
y
E, so that indeed no further information on x can be obtained
from the E-register. This notation naturally extends to ρX↔Y↔E|E simply by considering ρXY E|E
instead of ρXY E . Explicitly, ρX↔Y↔E|E =
∑
x,y PXY |E(x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρ
y
E|E .
Non-uniformity We can say that a quantum adversary has little information about X if the
distribution PX given his quantum state is close to uniform. Formally, this distance is quantified
by the non-uniformity of X given ρE =
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E defined as
d(X|E) :=
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥1/|X | ⊗ ρE −
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ
x
E
∥∥∥∥∥
1
. (2)
Intuitively, d(X|E) ≤ ε means that the distribution of X is ε-close to uniform even given ρE , i.e.,
ρE gives hardly any information about X. A simple property of the non-uniformity which follows
from its definition is that it does not change given independent information. Formally,
d(X|E,D) = d(X|E) (3)
for any cqq-state of the form ρXED = ρXE ⊗ ρD.
2.2 Entropic Quantities
Throughout this paper we use a number of entropic quantities. The binary-entropy function is
defined as h(p) := −p log p−(1−p) log(1−p), where log denotes the logarithm to base 2 throughout
this paper.
3The notation is inspired by the classical setting where the corresponding independence of X and Z given Y can
be expressed by saying that X ↔ Y ↔ Z forms a Markov chain.
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2.2.1 (Conditional) Smooth Min-Entropy
We are concerned with the situation where an attacker holds quantum information in register E
about a classical variable X, described by a classical-quantum state (cq-state) of the form
ρXE =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ
x
E .
We define the guessing probability of X given E as the success probability of the best measurement
carried out on E in order to guess X,
pguess(X|E) := max
{Mx}
∑
x
PX(x)Tr(Mxρ
x
E) ,
where the maximisation is over all POVMs {Mx} acting on register E. The conditional min-entropy
of X given E is defined as Hmin(X|E) := − log pguess(X|E).
In case the adversary’s information E is described by a classical variable Y , one can show that
the guessing probibility becomes
pguess(X|Y ) :=
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y) =
∑
y
max
x
PXY (x, y) .
More generally, we define Hmin(XE|Y ) for any event E as Hmin(XE|Y ) := − log
(
pguess(XE|Y )
)
where4
pguess(XE|Y ) :=
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PXE|Y (x|y) =
∑
y
max
x
PXY E(x, y) .
The conditional smooth min-entropy Hεmin (X|Y ) is then defined as
Hεmin (X|Y ) := max
E
Hmin(XE|Y )
where the max is over all events E with P [E ] ≥ 1− ε.
Obviously, the unconditional versions of smooth and non-smooth min-entropy are obtained by
using a constant Y . Furthermore, conditional smooth min-entropy can also be defined for quantum
side information, we refer to [Ren05, KWW09] for the formal definitions.
In this paper, we will use the fact that smooth min-entropy obeys the chain rule [Ren05,
Theorem 3.2.12], i.e. for a ccq-state ρXYE , we have
Hεmin(X|Y E) ≥ H
ε
min(X|E) − log |Y| , (4)
where |Y| is the alphabet size of Y .
2.3 Min-Entropy Splitting
The key ingredients for the security proofs of both the 1-2 OT and the secure identification schemes
in [DFR+07, DFSS07] are uncertainty relations and variants of the min-entropy splitting lemma. In
this section, we present an overview over the variants known and derived for the bounded-quantum-
storage model and point out how they can be applied in the noisy-quantum-storage model.
4pguess(XE|Y ) can be understood as the optimal probability in guessing X and have E occur, when given Y .
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If the joint entropy of two random variables X0 and X1 is large, then one is tempted to conclude
that at least one ofX0 andX1 must still have large entropy, e.g. half of the original entropy. Whereas
such a reasoning is correct for Shannon entropy (it follows easily from the chain rule and the fact
that conditioning does not increase the entropy), it is in general incorrect for min-entropy. There
exist joint probability distributions PX0X1 for which guessing X0 and X1 individually is easy, but
guessing X0 and X1 simultaneously is hard. Intuitively, for these distributions, guessing the value
xi with the highest probability is easy, because the probabilities over the other variable X1−i are
uniform, but still sum up to a significant mass.
However, the following basic version of the min-entropy splitting lemma, which first appeared
in a preliminary version of [Wul07] and was later developed further in the context of randomness
extraction [KR07], shows that the intuition about splitting the min-entropy is correct in a ran-
domized sense. This lemma (with a slightly different notion of min-entropy) is used in the security
proof of the 1-2 OT scheme in [DFR+07].
Lemma 2.1 (Min-Entropy-Splitting Lemma [DFR+07]) Let ε ≥ 0, and let X0,X1 and Z be
random variables with Hεmin(X0X1|Z) ≥ α. Then, there exists a random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such
that
Hεmin(XD|DZ) ≥ α/2 − 1 .
Proof. Let E be an event such that P [E ] ≥ 1− ε and∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
x0,x1
PX0X1E|Z(x0, x1|z) ≤ 2
−α . (5)
By assumption, such an events exist.5 For a given z, we defineD to be 0 if and only if PX0|Z(X0|z) <
2−α/2. Then,∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
x0
PX0DE|Z(x0, 0|z) ≤
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
x0
PX0D|Z(x0, 0|z)
=
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
x0
PX0|Z(x0|z)PD|X0Z(0|x0, z) < 2
−α/2 ,
(6)
because either PX0|Z(x0|z) < 2
−α/2 or PD|X0Z(0|x0, z) = 0 by definition of D. On the other hand,
we have∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
x1
PX1DE|Z(x1, 1|z) =
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
x1
∑
x0
PX0X1DE|Z(x0, x1, 1|z)
≤ 2α/2
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
x0,x1
PX0X1E|Z(x0, x1|z) ≤ 2
−α/2 ,
(7)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption (5) and the first is a consequence of the
fact that the number of non-zero summands (in the sum over x0) cannot be larger than 2
α/2,
because for any x0 with PX0X1D|Z(x0, x1, 1|z) > 0, it also holds (by the definition of D) that
PX0|Z(x0|z) ≥ 2
−α/2 and the sum over all those x0 would exceed 1 if there were more than 2
α/2
summands.
5In case ε = 0, i.e., α lower bounds the ordinary (rather then the smooth) min-entropy, the E is the events “that
always occurs” and can be ignored from the rest of the analysis.
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Combining (6) and (7), we conclude that
pguess(XDE|DZ) =
∑
d
∑
z
PZ(z)max
x
PXDDE|Z(xd, d|z) ≤ 2 · 2
−α/2 .
The claim now follows by definition of Hεmin. ✷
In order to prove the security of the identification scheme (see Section 6), a more refined version
of the min-entropy splitting lemma was derived in [DFSS10]. We reproduce it here for convenience.
Lemma 2.2 (Entropy-Splitting Lemma [DFSS10]) Let ε ≥ 0. Let X1, . . . ,Xm and Z be ran-
dom variables such that Hεmin(XiXj |Z) ≥ α for all i 6= j. Then there exists a random variable V over
{1, . . . ,m} such that for any independent random variable W over {1, . . . ,m} with Hmin(W ) ≥ 1,
H2mεmin (XW |V WZ, V 6=W ) ≥ α/2 − log(m)− 1 .
Proof. For any pair i 6= j let Eij be an event such that P [Eij ] ≥ 1− ε and∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi,xj
PXiXjEij |Z(xi, xj |z) ≤ 2
−α (8)
for all xi ∈ Xi, xj ∈ Xj and z ∈ Z. By assumption, such events exist.
6 For any j = 1, . . . ,m − 1
define
Lj = {(x1, . . . , xm, z) : PX1|Z(x1|z), . . . , PXj−1|Z(xj−1|z) < 2
−α/2 ∧ PXj |Z(xj |z) ≥ 2
−α/2}
Informally, Lj consists of the tuples (x1, . . . , xm, z), where xj has “large” probability given z whereas
all previous entries have small probabilities. We define V as follows. We let V be the index
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} such that (X1, . . . ,Xm, Z) ∈ Lj, and in case there is no such j we let V be m.
Note that if there does exist such an j then it is unique.
We need to show that this V satisfies the claim. Fix j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Clearly, for i < j,∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z) ≤
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV |Z(xi, j|z)
=
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXi|Z(xi|z)PV |XiZ(j|xi, z) < 2
−α/2 .
(9)
Indeed, either PXi|Z(xi|z) < 2
−α/2 or PV |XiZ(j|xi, z) = 0 by definition of V . Consider now i > j.
Note that∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z) =
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
∑
xj
PXiXjV Eij |Z(xi, xj , j|z)
≤ 2α/2
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi,xj
PXiXjEij |Z(xi, xj |z) ≤ 2
−α/2 ,
(10)
6In case ε = 0, i.e., α lower bounds the ordinary (rather then the smooth) min-entropy, the Eij are the events
“that always occur” and can be ignored from the rest of the analysis.
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where the last inequality follows from the assumption (8) and the first is a consequence of the fact
that the number of non-zero summands (in the sum over xj) cannot be larger than 2
α/2, because
for any xj with PXiXjV Eij |Z(xi, xj , j|z) > 0, it also holds that PXj |Z(xj |z) ≥ 2
−α/2 and the sum
over all those xj would exceed 1 if there were more than 2
α/2 summands. Note that per-se, Eij is
only defined in the probability space given by Xi, Xj and Z, but it can be naturally extended to
the probability space given by X1, . . . ,Xn, Z, V by assuming it to be independent of anything else
when given Xi,Xj , Z, so that e.g. PXiV Eij |Z is indeed well-defined.
Consider now an independent random variableW with Hmin(W ) ≥ 1. By the assumptions onW
it holds that P [V 6=W ] ≥ 12 and PXW VWZ(xi, j, i, z) = PXiVWZ(xi, j, i, z) = PXiV Z(xi, j, z)PW (i).
In the probability space determined by the random variables X1, . . . ,Xn, V,W,Z and all of the
events Eij, define the event E as E := EWV , so that PXW VWE|Z(xi, j, i|z) = PXiVWEij |Z(xi, j, i|z) =
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z)PW (i). Note that
P [E¯ ] =
∑
i,j
PVW E¯WV (j, i) =
∑
i,j
PV E¯ij (j)PW (i) ≤
∑
i,j
P [E¯ij ]PW (i) ≤ mε
and thus P [E¯ |V 6=W ] ≤ P [E¯ ]/P [V 6=W ] ≤ 2mε. From the above, it follows that
pguess(XW , E|V WZ, V 6=W ) =
∑
z,i,j
max
x
PXW VWZE|V 6=W (x, j, i, z) ≤ 2
∑
z,i 6=j
max
x
PXW VWZE(x, j, i, z)
= 2
∑
z,i 6=j
PZ(z) ·max
x
PXW VWE|Z(x, j, i|z) = 2
∑
z,i 6=j
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z) · PW (i)
= 2
∑
i
PW (i)
∑
j 6=i
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z) ≤ 2m · 2
−α/2 ,
where we used (9) and (10) in the last inequality. The claim now follows by definition of Hεmin. ✷
2.4 Quantum Uncertainty Relation.
At the very core of our security proofs lies (a special case of) the quantum uncertainty relation
from [DFR+07]7, that lower bounds the (smooth) min-entropy of the outcome when measuring an
arbitrary n-qubit state in a random basis θ ∈ {0, 1}n.
Theorem 2.3 (Uncertainty Relation [DFR+07]) Let E be an arbitrary fixed n-qubit state.
Let Θ be uniformly distributed over {+,×}n (independent of E), and let X ∈ {0, 1}n be the random
variable for the outcome of measuring E in basis Θ. Then, for any δ > 0, the conditional smooth
min-entropy is lower bounded by
Hεmin(X|Θ) ≥
(1
2
− 2δ
)
n
with ε ≤ 2−σ(δ)n and
σ(δ) :=
δ2 log(e)
32(2 − log(δ))2
. (11)
7In [DFR+07], a stricter notion of conditional smooth min-entropy was used, which in particular implies the bound
as stated here.
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2.5 Privacy Amplification
We will make use of two-universal hash functions. A class F of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ
is called two-universal, if for all x 6= y ∈ {0, 1}n, we have Prf∈RF [f(x) = f(y)] ≤ 2
−ℓ [CW79].
The following theorem expresses how the application of hash functions increases the privacy of a
random variable X given a quantum adversary holding ρE, the function F and a classical random
variable U :
Theorem 2.4 ([Ren05, DFR+07]) Let F be a class of two-universal hash functions from {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}ℓ. Let F be a random variable that is uniformly and independently distributed over F , and
let ρXUE be a ccq-state. Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
d(F (X)|F,U,E) ≤ 2−
1
2(H
ε
min(X|UE)−ℓ)−1 + ε .
3 The Noisy-Quantum-Storage Model
The noisy-quantum-storage model has been established in [WST08, STW09] for the special case
where the dishonest receiver is limited to so-called “individual-storage attacks”, i.e. he treats every
incoming pulse independently (akin to individual attacks in QKD).
The most general setting considered here is exactly the one described in detail in [KWW09,
Sections 1.3 and 3.3], see Figure 1 for an illustration. The cheating receiver is computationally un-
bounded, has unlimited classical storage and can perform perfect quantum operations. If the
protocol instructs parties to wait for time ∆t, a dishonest player has to discard all quantum
information, except for what he can encode arbitrarily into his (noisy) quantum storage. This
storing process is formally described by a completely positive and trace-preserving (CPTP) map
F : B(Hin)→ B(Hout).
As in [KWW09], let
PFsucc(n) := max
{Dx}x,{ρx}x
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
Tr(DxF(ρx)) (12)
be the maximal success probability of correctly decoding a randomly chosen n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n
sent over the quantum channel F . Here, the maximum is over families of code states {ρx}x∈{0,1}n
on Hin and decoding POVMs {Dx}x∈{0,1}n on Hout.
Intuitively, if the quantum channel F does not allow to transmit enough classical information
over it, we should be able to prove security against a dishonest Bob with such a storage channel.
Indeed, the following two lemmas from [KWW09] formalize this intuition and are the key ingredients
to connect the security of protocols in the noisy-storage model for such channels with their ability
to transmit classical information.
Lemma 3.1 ([KWW09]) Consider an arbitrary cq-state ρXQ and a CPTP map F : B(HQ) →
B(Hout). Then, Hmin(X|F(Q)) ≥ − logP
F
succ(⌊Hmin(X)⌋).
Lemma 3.2 ([KWW09]) Consider an arbitrary ccq-state ρXTQ, and let ε, ε
′ ≥ 0 be arbitrary.
Let F : B(HQ)→ B(HQout) be an arbitrary CPTP map. Then,
Hε+ε
′
min (X|TF(Q)) ≥ − logP
F
succ
(⌊
Hεmin(X|T ) − log
1
ε′
⌋)
.
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Figure 1: (from [WCSL10]): During waiting times ∆t, the adversary must use his noisy quantum
storage described by the CPTP map F . Before using his quantum storage, he performs any (error-
free) “encoding attack” of his choosing, which consists of a measurement or an encoding into an
error-correcting code. After time ∆t, he receives some additional information that he can use for
decoding.
We are interested in channels N which satisfy the following strong-converse property : The
success probability (12) decays exponentially for rates R above the capacity, i.e., it takes the form
PN
⊗n
succ (nR) ≤ 2
−nγN (R) where γN (R) > 0 for all R > CN . (13)
In [KW09], property (13) was shown to hold for a large class of channels. An important example
for which we obtain security is the d-dimensional depolarizing channel Nr : B(C
d)→ B(Cd) defined
for d ≥ 2 as
Nr(ρ) := rρ+ (1− r)
1
d
for some fixed 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 , (14)
which replaces the input state ρ with the completely mixed state with probability 1− r. For d = 2,
having storage channel N⊗nr means that the adversary can store n qubits which are affected by
independent and identically distributed noise. To see for which values of r we can obtain security,
we need to consider the classical capacity of the depolarizing channel as evaluated by King [Kin03].
For d = 2, i.e., qubits, it is given by
CNr = 1 +
1 + r
2
log
1 + r
2
+
1− r
2
log
1− r
2
.
4 1-2 Oblivious Transfer
4.1 Security Definition and Protocol
In this section we prove the security of a randomized version of 1-2 OT (Theorem 4.2) from which
we can easily obtain 1-2 OT. In such a randomized 1-2 OT protocol, Alice does not input two strings
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herself, but instead receives two strings S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ chosen uniformly at random. Randomized
OT (ROT) can easily be converted into OT. After the ROT protocol is completed, Alice uses her
strings S0, S1 obtained from ROT as one-time pads to encrypt her original inputs Sˆ0 and Sˆ1, i.e. she
sends an additional classical message consisting of Sˆ0⊕S0 and Sˆ1⊕S1 to Bob. Bob can retrieve the
message of his choice by computing SC ⊕ (SˆC ⊕SC) = SˆC . He stays completely ignorant about the
other message SˆC since he is ignorant about SC . The security of a quantum protocol implementing
ROT is formally defined in [DFR+07] and justified in [FS09] (see also [WW08]).
Definition 4.1 An ε-secure 1-2 ROTℓ is a protocol between Alice and Bob, where Bob has input
C ∈ {0, 1}, and Alice has no input.
• (Correctness) If both parties are honest, then for any distribution of Bob’s input C, Alice gets
outputs S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ which are ε-close to uniform and independent of C and Bob learns
Y = SC except with probability ε.
• (Security against dishonest Alice) If Bob is honest and obtains output Y , then for any cheating
strategy of Alice resulting in her state ρA, there exist random variables S
′
0 and S
′
1 such that
Pr[Y = S′C ] ≥ 1− ε and C is independent of S
′
0,S
′
1 and ρA
8.
• (Security against dishonest Bob) If Alice is honest, then for any cheating strategy of Bob
resulting in his state ρB, there exists a random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that d(SD|SDDρB) ≤
ε.
We consider the same protocol for ROT as in [BBCS91, DFL+09].
Protocol 1 ([BBCS91, DFL+09]) 1-2 ROTℓ
1. Alice picks x ∈R {0, 1}
n and θ ∈R {+,×}
n. At time t = 0, she sends |x1〉θ1 , . . . , |xn〉θn to
Bob.
2. Bob picks θˆ ∈R {+,×}
n at random and measures the ith qubit in the basis θˆi. He obtains
outcome xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
3. Alice sends the basis information θ = θ1, . . . , θn to Bob.
4. Bob, holding choice bit c, forms the sets Ic = {i ∈ [n] | θi = θˆi} and I1−c = {i ∈ [n] | θi 6= θˆi}.
He sends I0,I1 to Alice.
5. Alice picks two hash functions f0, f1 ∈R F , where F is a class of two-universal hash functions.
She sends f0,f1 to Bob. Alice outputs s0 = f0(x|I0) and s1 = f1(x|I1)
9.
6. Bob outputs sc = fc(xˆ|Ic).
8Existence of the random variables S′0, S
′
1 has to be understood as follows: given the cq-state ρYA of honest Bob
and dishonest Alice, there exists a cccq-state ρY S′
0
S′
1
A such that tracing out the registers of S
′
0, S
′
1 yields the original
state ρY A and the stated properties hold.
9If x|Ib is less than n bits long Alice pads the string x|Ib with 0’s to get an n bit-string in order to apply the hash
function to n bits.
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4.2 Security Analysis
Correctness First of all, note that it is clear that the protocol fulfills its task correctly. Bob
can determine the string x|Ic (except with negligible probability 2
−n the set Ic is non-empty) and
hence obtains sc. Alice’s outputs s0, s1 are perfectly independent of each other and of c.
Security against Dishonest Alice Security holds in the same way as shown in [DFR+07]. Alice
cannot learn anything about Bob’s choice bit from the index information I0,I1 she receives, and
Alice’s input strings can be extracted by letting her interact with an unbounded receiver.
Security against Dishonest Bob Proving that the protocol is secure against Bob requires
more work. Our goal is to show that there exists a D ∈ {0, 1} such that Bob with noisy storage as
described in Section 3 is completely ignorant about SD. Since we are performing 1-out-of-2 oblivious
transfer of ℓ-bit strings, ℓ corresponds to the “amount” of oblivious transfer we can perform for a
given security parameter ε and number of qubits n.
Theorem 4.2 Fix 0 < δ < 14 and let
ε = 2exp
(
−
(δ/4)2
32(2 + log 4δ )
2
· n
)
. (15)
Then, for any attack of a dishonest Bob with storage F : B(Hin)→ B(Hout), Protocol 1 is 2ε-secure
against a dishonest receiver Bob according to Definition 4.1, if n ≥ 4/δ and
ℓ ≤ −
1
2
logPFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
n
)
− log
(
1
ε
)
.
Proof. We need to show the existence of a binary random variable D such that SD¯ is ε-close to
uniform from Bob’s point of view.
We can argue as in the proof of the security of weak string erasure for honest Alice (Section 3.3
in [KWW09]) that
H
ε/2
min (X0X1|ΘK) ≥
n
2
−
nδ
2
,
where K denotes Bob’s classical information obtained from the encoding attack. Classical min-
entropy splitting (Lemma 2.1) then ensures that there exists a binary random variable D ∈ {0, 1}
such that
H
ε/2
min
(
XD|DΘK
)
≥
n
4
−
nδ
4
− 1 .
One can now continue to argue as in the proof of Theorem 3.3 in [KWW09], i.e. we use
Lemma 3.2 to get
Hεmin
(
XD|DΘKQout
)
≥ − logPFsucc
(
n
4
−
nδ
4
− 1− log
2
ε
)
≥ − log PFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
n
)
,
where the last step follows in the same way as in [KWW09] from the monotinicity of the success
probability PFsucc(m) ≤ P
F
succ(m
′) for m ≥ m′ and the fact that log 2ε ≤
δ
2n ≤
3δ
4 n− 1.
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The rest of the security proof is analogous to the proof in [DFR+07]: It follows from the chain
rule for smooth min-entropy (4) that
Hεmin
(
XD|DΘSDKQout
)
≥ Hεmin
(
XDSD|DΘKQout
)
− ℓ
≥ − logPFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
n
)
− ℓ.
The privacy amplification Theorem 2.4 yields
d(FD(XD) | DΘFDSDKQout) ≤ 2
− 1
2
(− logPFsucc(( 14−δ)n)−2ℓ) + ε (16)
which is smaller than 2ε as long as
−
1
2
logPFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
n
)
− ℓ ≥ log
(
1
ε
)
.
from which our claim follows. ✷
4.3 Tensor-product channels
Corollary 4.3 Let Bob’s storage be described by F = N⊗νn with ν > 0, where N satisfies the
strong-converse property (13), and
CN · ν <
1
4
.
Fix δ ∈]0, 14 − CN · ν[, and let ε be defined as in (18). Then, for any attack of a dishonest Bob,
Protocol 1 is 2ε-secure against a dishonest receiver Bob according to Definition 4.1, if n ≥ 4/δ and
ℓ ≤ γN
(
1/4− δ
ν
)
·
νn
2
− log
(
1
ε
)
.
Proof. We can substitute n by νn and R by R/ν in the strong-converse property (13) to obtain
−
1
n
logPN
⊗νn
succ (nR) ≥ ν · γ
N (R/ν) .
The claim then follows from Theorem 4.2 by setting R := 14 − δ. ✷
For the d-dimensional depolarizing channel
Nr(ρ) = rρ+ (1− r)
1
d
. (17)
which preserves a d-dimensional input state with probability r and depolarizes it completely with
probability 1− r, it has been shown in [KW09, KWW09] that
γN (R) = max
α≥1
α− 1
α
(
R− log d+
1
1− α
log
((
r +
1− r
d
)α
+ (d− 1)
(
1− r
d
)α))
.
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Figure 2: Possible regions of a depolarizing qubit channel with noise parameter r and storage rate ν
where security for OT can be established for asymptotically many pulses. The [KWW09]-approach
yields the blue region, whereas our simpler approach gives the red subset of it.
We compare the parameters in terms of OT- and error-rate of our approach to the ones
in [KWW09]. In Figure 2, the regions of the noise-parameter r and storage-rate ν from our
approach (red) and the [KWW09]-approach (blue) are shown. As the information rate after min-
entropy splitting in our approach is lower than without min-entropy splitting, the range of noisy
storage channels for which security can theoretically be shown is smaller in our approach. However,
we will see in the following that the error overhead due to the complicated post-processing with
interactive hashing in [KWW09] nullifies that advantage again.
We investigate two scenarios, in both of which we are ready to accept a security error of at
most 10−8. In the first scenario, we are given n = 1010 pulses to work with against an adversary
with depolarizing qubit channel (d = 2) with noise rate r and storage rate ν = 1. In our approach,
according to Corollary 4.3, the security error is 2ε where ε is defined in (18), thus for n = 1010, we
can choose δ = 0.0106 to have the error small enough. The resulting OT-rate ℓ/n is the red line
in Figure 3 for different noise rates r and a storage rate of ν = 1. In the approach of [KWW09],
the security error is harder to control as it also depends on other parameters such as the noise rate
r and a new parameter ω. In order to keep it below the required 10−8, we choose δ = 0.011 and
ω = 2. The resulting OT-rate is plotted as blue dashed line in Figure 3. Note that this amount of
pulses are not sufficient to keep the security error below 10−8 for noise rates r above 0.21.
In Figure 4, we investigate the same setting but with many more pulses, namely n = 1015.
With that many pulses, the error is better to control in the [KWW09]-approach and leads to higher
OT-rates compared to our approach for noise parameters between 0.34 < r < 0.52. In all other
cases, our simpler approach allows to get OT of longer strings while keeping the security error
below 10−8.
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Figure 3: The adversary’s storage is depo-
larizing qubit noise F = N⊗nr with d =
2, ν = 1, and n = 1010. The horizon-
tal axis represents the noise parameter r,
while the vertical axis represents the OT-
rate ℓ/n. The rates are only plotted for re-
gions where the security error stays below
10−8. The red line represents the OT-rate
obtained from our approach (Corollary 4.3
with δ = 0.0106). The dashed blue line is
the rate from the [KWW09]-approach with
optimised extra parameters δ = 0.011 and
ω = 2. For r > 0.21, the security error is
above the allowed threshold 10−8. For this
many pulses, our approach provides a higher
OT-rate for all possible noise parameters r
while keeping the security error reasonably
low.
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Figure 4: As in Figure 3, but for many more
pulses, namely n = 1015. The red line rep-
resents the OT-rate obtained from our ap-
proach (Corollary 4.3 with δ = 0.000057588).
The dashed blue line is the rate from the
[KWW09]-approach with optimised extra
parameters δ = 0.0005 and ω = 10. For
r > 0.47, the security error is above the al-
lowed threshold 10−8. For noise parameters
between 0.34 < r < 0.52, the [KWW09]-
approach yields higher OT-rates. For all
other noise rates r, our simpler approach
yields higher rates.
To put these numbers of pulses into perspective, one can think of a weak-coherent pulse setup
which runs at 1GHz and emits a single photons with Poisson distribution with parameter µ = 1,
i.e. with probability e−µµ ≈ 0.3679 per pulse. Hence, we have to wait approximately 27 seconds
to obtain n = 1010 single pulses, whereas it takes 106 · e seconds, i.e. roughly 30 days to generate
n = 1015 single pulses.
5 Robust Oblivious Transfer
In a practical setting, imperfections in Alice’s and Bob’s apparatus as well as in the communication
channel manifest themselves in form of erasures and bit-flip errors. This setting has been analyzed
for individual attacks in [STW09] and for general attacks in [WCSL10]. In the following, we present
an upgraded protocol for oblivious transfer along the lines of [WCSL10] but with a much simpler
and natural post-processing.
5.1 Protocol
We consider the same setup as in [WCSL10]. Before engaging in the actual protocol, Alice and
Bob agree on a security-error probability ε > 0. The parameter phB,no click denotes the probability
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that an honest Bob observes no click in his detection apparatus and the corresponding parameter
ζhB,no click says how much fluctuations we allow. Typically, we use a ζ
h
B,no click of order
√
ln(2/ε)/(2n)
such that the Chernoff bound allows us to argue that phB,no click lies in the interval [(p
h
B,no click −
ζhB,no click)n, (p
h
B,no click + ζ
h
B,no click)n] except with probability ε.
Error-correction is done using a one-way (forward) error correction scheme, e.g. by using low-
density parity-check (LDPC) codes. The players agree on a linear code which can correct errors in
a k-bit string by announcing the syndrome of the string. If each bit of the string is flipped inde-
pendently with probability phB,err, this procedure amounts to sending error-correcting information
of at most 1.2 · h(phB,err) · k bits [ELAB09].
We assume that the players have synchronized clocks. In each time slot, Alice sends one qubit
to Bob.
Protocol 2 Robust 1-2 ROTℓ(C, T, ε)
1. Alice picks x ∈R {0, 1}
n and θ ∈R {+,×}
n uniformly at random.
2. Bob picks θˆ ∈R {+,×}
n uniformly at random.
3. For i = 1, . . . , n: In time slot t = i, Alice sends bit xi encoded in basis θi to Bob.
In each time slot, Bob measures the incoming qubit in basis θˆi and records whether he detects
a photon or not. He obtains some bit-string xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m with m ≤ n.
4. Bob reports back to Alice in which time slots he recorded a click.
5. Alice restricts herself to the set of m < n bits that Bob did not report as missing. Let this
set of qubits be Sremain with |Sremain| = m. If m does not lie in the interval [(1− p
h
B,no click −
ζhB,no click)n, (1− p
h
B,no click + ζ
h
B,no click)n], then Alice aborts the protocol.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
6. Alice sends the basis information θ = θ1, . . . , θm of the remaining positions to Bob.
7. Bob, holding choice bit c, forms the sets Ic = {i ∈ [m] | θi = θˆi} and I1−c = {i ∈ [m] | θi 6=
θˆi}. He sends I0,I1 to Alice.
8. Alice picks two two-universal hash functions f0, f1 ∈R F and sends f0,f1 and the syndromes
syn(x|I0) and syn(x|I1) to Bob. Alice outputs s0 = f0(x|I0) and s1 = f1(x|I1).
9. Bob uses syn(x|Ic) to correct the errors on his output xˆ|Ic. He obtains the corrected bit-string
xcor and outputs s
′
c = fc(xcor).
5.2 Security Analysis
Correctness If both players are honest, Bob reports back enough rounds to Alice. Therefore, in
Step 5 the protocol is aborted with probability at most ε. The error-correcting codes are chosen
such that Bob can decode except with probability ε. These facts imply that if both parties are
honest, the protocol is correct except with probability 2ε.
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Security against Dishonest Alice Even though in this scenario Bob does communicate to
Alice, the information about which qubits were erased is independent of Bob’s choice bit c as this
bit is only used in Step 7. Hence Alice does not learn anything about his choice bit c. Her input
strings can be extracted as in the analysis of Protocol 2.
Security against Dishonest Bob In the previous Section 4, we have seen that the security
analysis for weak string erasure from [KWW09] essentially carries over to 1-2 oblivious transfer.
Similarly, the security analysis for weak string erasure with errors from [WCSL10] can be adapted
to analyse Protocol 1.
We will use the following probabilities: (see [WCSL10] for details and some example parameters
for concrete setups)
pdB,no click dishonest Bob observes no click in his detection apparatus
(due to imperfections in Alice’s apparatus)
phB,no click honest Bob observes no click in his detection apparatus
(due to losses and imperfections of both player’s apparatus)
p1sent Alice sends exactly 1 photon.
phB,err honest Bob outputs the wrong bit
(due to misalignments and noise on the channel)
Theorem 5.1 (Security against dishonest Bob) Fix 0 < δ < 14 and let
ε = 2exp
(
−
(δ/4)2
32(2 + log 4δ )
2
·m1
)
. (18)
Then, for any attack of a dishonest Bob with storage F : B(Hin) → B(Hout), Protocol 2 is 2ε-
secure against a dishonest receiver Bob according to Definition 4.1, if m1 ≥ 4/δ and the length of
the OT-strings
ℓ ≤ −
1
2
logPFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
m1
)
− 1.2 · h(phB,err) ·
m
2
− log
(
1
ε
)
,
where m1 := (p1sent − p
h
B,no click + p
d
B,no click)n is the minimal number of single-photon rounds re-
maining and m = (1− phB,no click)n is the total number of rounds remaining.
Proof. As in [WCSL10], we adopt the conservative viewpoint that a dishonest Bob does not
experience any bit-errors nor losses on the channel. Furthermore, we assume that a dishonest
receiver can detect when multiple photons arrive and extract the encoded bit without knowledge
of the encoding basis. These multi-photon rounds will thus not contribute to the uncertainty of a
dishonest Bob. He will also not keep any quantum information about these bits.
The main complication in this more practical scenario is that a dishonest Bob might falsely
report back rounds as missing in order to decrease the overall fraction of single-photon rounds
where he has uncertainty about the encoded bits.
Let phB,no click be the probability that honest Bob does not register a click (due to losses in
the channel and imperfect apparatus of both players). On the other hand, let pdB,no click be the
18
probability that a dishonest Bob does not register a click (due to imperfections in Alice’s apparatus).
We assume that a dishonest Bob will always report a round as missing if he did not register a
click (because there is no advantage for him not doing so). We also assumed that Bob gets full
information when more than one photon was sent and hence, he will not report these rounds as
missing. We conclude that out of the n rounds, dishonest Bob will report the maximal amount
of (phB,no click − p
d
B,no click)n single-photon rounds as missing. That means that of the total m =
(1− phB,no click)n rounds that Alice accepts, at least
m1 := (p1sent − (p
h
B,no click − p
d
B,no click))n (19)
are single-photon rounds.
It can be argued as in [WCSL10] that these m1 single-photon rounds are the (only) ones con-
tributing to the uncertainty in terms of min-entropy about the string X. Formally, we have
H
ε/2
min (X0X1|ΘK) ≥
m1
2
−
m1δ
2
, (20)
where X0,X1 are the sub-strings of X formed according to the index sets I0 and I1, 0 < δ <
1
4 is
fixed and the error parameter ε is
ε = 2exp
(
−
(δ/4)2
32(2 + log 4δ )
2
·m1
)
. (21)
Proceeding as in the proof of Protocol 1 (with m1 instead of n), classical min-entropy splitting
(Lemma 2.1) then ensures that there exists a binary random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that
H
ε/2
min
(
XD|DΘK
)
≥
m1
4
−
m1δ
4
− 1 .
Then, we use Lemma 3.2 to get
Hεmin
(
XD|DΘKQout
)
≥ − logPFsucc
(
m1
4
−
m1δ
4
− 1− log
2
ε
)
≥ − log PFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
m1
)
,
where the last step follows in the same way as in [KWW09] from the monotinicity of the success
probability PFsucc(k) ≤ P
F
succ(k
′) for k ≥ k′ and the fact that log 2ε ≤
δ
2m
1 ≤ 3δ4 m
1 − 1.
Additionally, the dishonest receiver learns the two syndromes Syn(X0), Syn(X1). As X0 and
X1 are not necessarily independent from dishonest Bob’s point of view, the two syndromes reduce
Bob’s min-entropy about XD by at most 1.2 · h(p
h
err) ·m bits of information.
It follows from the chain rule for smooth min-entropy (4) that
Hεmin
(
XD|DΘSDSyn(X0)Syn(X1)KQout
)
≥ Hεmin
(
XD|DΘKQout
)
− ℓ− 1.2 · h(pherr) ·m
≥ − logPFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
m1
)
− ℓ− 1.2 · h(pherr) ·m.
The privacy amplification Theorem 2.4 yields
d(FD(XD) | DΘFDSDKQout) ≤ 2
− 1
2
(− logPFsucc(( 14−δ)m
1)−2ℓ−1.2·h(pherr)·m) + ε (22)
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which is smaller than 2ε as long as
−
1
2
log PFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
m1
)
− ℓ− 1.2 · h(pherr) ·
m
2
≥ log
(
1
ε
)
.
from which our claim follows. ✷
In the same way as Corollary 4.3, we can derive
Corollary 5.2 Let Bob’s storage be given by F = N⊗νn for a storage rate ν > 0, N satisfying the
strong converse property (13) and having capacity CN bounded by
CN · ν <
(
1
4
− δ
)
(p1sent − p
h
B,no click + p
d
B,no click) . (23)
Then Protocol 2 is 2ε-secure against a dishonest receiver Bob according to Definition 4.1 with the
following parameters: Let δ ∈]0, 14 − CN · ν[ and m
1 ≥ 4/δ. Then the length ℓ of the OT-strings is
bounded by
ℓ ≤
1
2
ν · γN
(
R
ν
)
· n− 1.2 · h(phB,err) · (1− p
h
B,err)
n
2
− log
(
1
ε
)
, (24)
where γN is the strong converse parameter of N (see (13)) and
m = (1− phB,no click)n (the number of remaining rounds) ,
m1 = (p1sent − p
h
B,no click + p
d
B,no click)n (the minimal number of single-photon rounds) ,
R =
(
1
4 − δ
)
m1
n (the rate at which dishonest Bob has to send information
through storage) ,
for sufficiently large n. The error has the form
ε(δ) ≤ 2 exp
(
−
δ2
512(4 + log 1δ )
2
· (p1sent − p
h
B,no click + p
d
B,no click)n
)
. (25)
6 Password-Based Identification
In this section, we show how the techniques for proving security in the noisy-quantum-storage model
also apply to the protocol from [DFSS07, DFSS10] achieving secure password-based identification
in the bounded-quantum-storage model. This answers an open question posed in [KWW09].
6.1 Task and Protocol
A user Alice wants to identify herself to a server Bob by means of a personal identification number
(PIN). This task can be achieved by securely evaluating the equality function on the player’s
inputs: Both Alice and Bob input passwords wA and wB from a set of possible passwords W into
the protocol and Bob learns as output whether wA = wB or not.
The protocol proposed in [DFSS07] is secure against an unbounded user Alice and a quantum-
memory bounded server Bob in the sense that it is guaranteed that if a dishonest player starts with
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quantum side information which is uncorrelated with the honest player’s password w, this dishonest
player is restricted to guess a possible w′ and find out whether w = w′ or not while not learning
anything more than this mere bit of information about the honest user’s password w. Formally,
security is defined as follows.
Definition 6.1 We call an identification protocol between user Alice and server Bob secure for the
user Alice with error ε against (dishonest) server Bob B′ if the following is satisfied: whenever the
initial state of B′ is independent of W , the joint state ρWE
B′
after the execution of the protocol is
such that there exists a random variable W ′ that is independent of W and such that
ρWW ′E
B′ |W
′ 6=W ≈ε ρW↔W ′↔E
B′ |W
′ 6=W .
The Markov-chain notation is explained in (1).
We consider the same protocol for password-based secure identification from [DFSS07], in the
more practical form presented in [DFL+09], where the receiving party measures in a random basis.
Let c :W → {+,×}n be the encoding function of a binary code of length n withm = |W| codewords
and minimal distance d. c can be chosen such that n is linear in log(m) or larger, and d is linear
in n. Furthermore, let F and G be strongly two-universal classes of hash functions from {0, 1}n to
{0, 1}ℓ and from W to {0, 1}ℓ, respectively, for some parameter ℓ.
Protocol 3 ([DFSS07, DFL+09]) Password-based identification Q-ID (w):
1. Alice picks x ∈R {0, 1}
n and θ ∈R {+,×}
n. At time t = 0, she sends |x1〉θ1 , . . . , |xn〉θn to
Bob.
2. Bob picks θˆ ∈R {+,×}
n at random and measures the ith qubit in basis θˆi. He obtains outcome
xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
3. Bob computes a string κ ∈ {+,×}n such that θˆ = c(w)⊕κ (interpreting + as 0 and × as 1 so
that ⊕ makes sense). He sends κ to Alice and they define the shifted code c′(w) := c(w) ⊕ κ.
4. Alice sends θ and f ∈R F to Bob. Both compute Iw := {i : θi = c
′(w)i}.
5. Bob sends g ∈R G to Alice.
6. Alice sends z := f(x|Iw)⊕ g(w) to Bob.
7. Bob accepts if and only if z = f(xˆ|Iw)⊕ g(w).
We note that this protocol can also be (non-trivially) extended to additionally withstand man-
in-the-middle attacks [DFSS07, DFSS10].
6.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 6.2 (Security against dishonest Bob) Fix 0 < δ < 14 and let σ(δ) be defined as
in (11). Then, for any attack of a dishonest Bob with storage channel F : B(Hin) → B(Hout),
Protocol 3 is an ε-secure identification protocol against a dishonest receiver Bob according to Defi-
nition 6.1, if d ≥ 4+4 log(m)δ and
ε = 2−
1
2
(− logPFsucc(( 14−δ)d)−ℓ) + 2−(σ(δ/4)d−log(m)−3) .
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To understand what the result on ε means, note that using a family of asymptotically good
codes, we can assume that d grows linearly with the main security parameter n, while still allowing
m (the number of passwords) to be exponential in n. So we may choose the parameters such
that dn ,
log(m)
n , and
ℓ
n are all constants. The result above now says that ε is exponentially small
as a function of n if these constants and the noisy channel F fulfill that for some 0 < δ < 14 ,
− logPFsucc(( 14−δ)d)
n −
ℓ
n > 0 and σ(δ/4)
d
n −
log(m)
n > 0. See Theorem 6.4 for a choice of parameters
that also takes server security into account.
Proof.
We use upper case letters W , X, Θ, K, F , G and Z for the random variables that describe the
respective values w, x, θ etc. in an execution of Q-ID.
Recall that in the noisy-storage model, we denote by K the classical outcome of Bob’s encoding
attack and Qin denotes Bob’s quantum state right before the waiting time.
We write Xj = X|Ij for any j. Note that dishonest Bob starts without any knowledge about
honest Alice’s password W and hence, W is independent of X, Θ, K, F , G and Qin.
For 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m, fix the value of X, and correspondingly of Xi and Xj , at the positions
where c(i) and c(j) coincide, and focus on the remaining (at least) d positions. The uncertainty
relation (Theorem 2.3) implies that the restriction of X to these positions has (12 − δ/2)d bits of
ε′-smooth min-entropy given Θ, where ε′ ≤ 2−σ(δ/4)d . Since every bit in the restricted X appears
in one of Xi and Xj , the pair Xi,Xj also has (
1
2 − δ/2)d bits of ε
′-smooth min-entropy given Θ and
K. The Entropy Splitting Lemma 2.2 implies that there exists W ′ (called V in Lemma 2.2) such
that if W 6= W ′ then XW has (
1
4 − δ/4)d − log(m) − 1 bits of 2mε
′-smooth min-entropy given W
and W ′ (and Θ,K), i.e.,
H2mε
′
min (XW |WW
′ΘK,W 6=W ′) ≥ (
1
4
− δ/4)d − log(m)− 1 .
By Lemma 3.2, it follows that for Qout = F(Qin), we get
H
(2m+1)ε′
min (XW |WW
′ΘKQout,W 6=W
′) ≥ − log PFsucc
((
1
4
− δ/4
)
d− log(m)− 1− log(1/ε′)
)
≥ − log PFsucc
((
1
4
− δ
)
d
)
,
where the last inequality follows as in the OT-case (proof of Theorem 4.2) from log(1/ε′) ≤ δ2d ≤
3δ
4 d− log(m)− 1 and the assumption on d.
Privacy amplification then guarantees that F (XW ) is ε
′′-close to random and independent of
F,W,W ′,Θ,K andQout, conditioned onW 6=W
′, where ε′′ = 12 · 2
− 1
2(− logP
F
succ(( 14−δ)d)−ℓ) + (2m+ 1)ε′.
It follows that Z = F (XW ) ⊕ G(W ) is ε
′′-close to random and independent of F,G,W,W ′,Θ,K
and Qout, conditioned on W 6= W
′. The rest of the argument is the same as in the original
proof [DFSS10].
Formally, we want to upper bound the trace distance between ρWW ′E
B′ |W
′ 6=W and ρW↔W ′↔E
B′ |W
′ 6=W .
Since the output state EB′ is, without loss of generality, obtained by applying some unitary trans-
form to the set of registers (Z,F,G,W ′,Θ,K,Qout), the distance above is equal to the distance
between ρWW ′(Z,F,G,Θ,K,Qout)|W ′ 6=W and ρW↔W ′↔(Z,F,G,Θ,K,Qout)|W ′ 6=W . We then get:
ρWW ′(Z,F,G,Θ,Qout)|W ′ 6=W ≈ε′′
1
2ℓ
1Z ⊗ ρWW ′(F,G,Θ,K,Qout)|W ′ 6=W
= 1
2ℓ
1Z ⊗ ρW↔W ′↔(F,G,Θ,K,Qout)|W ′ 6=W ≈ε′′ ρW↔W ′↔(Z,F,G,Θ,K,Qout)|W ′ 6=W ,
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where approximations follow from privacy amplification and the exact equality comes from the
independency of W , which, when conditioned on W ′ 6= W , translates to independency given W ′.
The claim follows with ε = 2ε′′ and the (crude) estimation 2(2m+ 1) ≤ 8m. ✷
Theorem 6.3 (Security against dishonest Alice [DFSS07]) If Hmin(W ) ≥ 1, then Q-ID is
secure against dishonest user Alice with security error ε = m2/2ℓ.
We call an identification scheme ε-secure against impersonation attacks if the protocol is secure
for both players with error at most ε in both cases. The following holds:
Theorem 6.4 If Hmin(W ) ≥ 1, then the identification scheme Q-ID (with suitable choice of param-
eters) is ε-secure against impersonation attacks for any unbounded user Alice and for any server
Bob with noisy storage of the form F = N⊗νn with ν > 0, where N satisfies the strong-converse
property (13), and
CN · ν <
1
4
,
and the security error is
ε = 2
− 1
3
(γN
(
1/4−δ
ν
)
νµn−6 log(m)−1)
+ 2−(σ(δ/4)µn−log(m)−4)
for an arbitrary 0 < δ < 14 , and where µ = h
−1(1 − log(m)/n), and h−1 is the inverse function of
the binary entropy function: h(p) := −p · log(p) − (1 − p) · log(1 − p) restricted to 0 < p ≤ 12 . In
particular, if log(m) is sublinear in n, then ε is negligible in n as long as γN
(
1/4−δ
ν
)
> 0.
Proof. First of all, we have that − logPN
⊗νn
succ ((1/4− δ)d) ≥ γ
N
(
1/4−δ
ν
)
νd.
We choose ℓ = 13 · γ
N
(
1/4−δ
ν
)
νd. Then security against dishonest Bob holds except with an
error ε = 2
− 1
3
·γN
(
1/4−δ
ν
)
νd
+ 2−(σ(δ/4)d−log(m)−3), and security against dishonest Alice holds except
with an error m2/2ℓ = 2
− 1
3
(
γN
(
1/4−δ
ν
)
νd−6 log(m)
)
. Using a code c, which asymptotically meets the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound [Tho83], d may be chosen arbitrarily close to n · h−1
(
1− log(m)/n
)
. In
particular, we can ensure that d does not differ from this value by more than 1. Inserting d = µ·n−1
in the expressions and using that γN
(
1/4−δ
ν
)
ν ≤ 1 yields the theorem. ✷
7 Conclusion
We have used the technical tool from [KWW09] to prove the security of the original protocols for
oblivious transfer and secure identification against adversaries performing general noisy-quantum-
storage attacks. The main advantage of our protocols is the straightforward constant-round clas-
sical post-processing which makes them easier to implement in the lab compared to the protocols
from [KWW09, WCSL10]. Their security analysis yields simpler expressions for the security error.
For a given number of pulses and a low security threshold, our approach generally yields higher
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OT-rates. We show for the first time the security of a password-based identification protocol against
general noisy-quantum-storage attacks.
This work leads to the question whether a similar result as in QKD holds, namely that general
storage attacks are no better than coherent (or individual) storage attacks for which the best
encoding attack is known [STW09].
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